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ABSTRACT
MODIE CHRISTON SMITH:  Representative Concepts:  How to Analyze Knowledge as 
True Belief in the Face of Gettier Counterexamples
(Under the direction of William G. Lycan)
Gettier counterexamples purport to show that justified true belief is insufficient for 
knowledge and, ipso facto, that true belief is insufficient for knowledge.  I develop a strategy 
that the proponent of the true belief analysis of knowledge can deploy to explain away 
Gettier counterexamples, i.e., to show how the subject in them can merely appear to believe 
something truly without knowing it.  I suggest that the proposition that appears to be truly, 
non-knowingly believed in a Gettier counterexample is actually not believed at all.  Rather, 
the subject believes a closely related, false proposition.  The subject cannot believe the true 
proposition, I propose, because of the special nature of certain of his or her concepts—what I 
call “representative concepts.”  The reason the subject appears to believe the true proposition 
is that we use a true sentence to ascribe the belief in the false proposition to him or her.
iii
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction................................................................................................................................1
Two Reasons to Think Knowledge is Merely True Belief........................................................3
Gettier Counterexamples...........................................................................................................9
Representative Concepts..........................................................................................................13
Representative Concepts and Belief........................................................................................23
Gettier Counterexamples, Again..............................................................................................32
Conclusion...............................................................................................................................38
WORKS CITED......................................................................................................................39
Introduction
There are two broad classes of counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is merely true 
belief (henceforth, “TB”).1  The first class is more traditional and comprises what we may 
call “justification counterexamples.”  A justification counterexample is one in which a person 
appears to truly believe something without knowing it, and the reason she appears not to 
know it is that she lacks good evidence for it or good reasons to believe it—in short, the 
belief is not justified.  The elements of the second, more recent class we may call “Gettier 
counterexamples.”  In a Gettier counterexample, a person appears to justifiably, truly believe 
something without knowing it.  The purpose of this paper is to outline a strategy whereby the 
proponent of TB can explain away Gettier counterexamples, or, to put it differently, the 
purpose is to sketch a believable story that TB’s proponent can tell about why the appearance 
of true, non-knowing belief in Gettier counterexamples is merely appearance.
Let me define precisely what I take a Gettier counterexample to be.  Edmund Gettier 
published “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” in 1963, and that paper instigated a certain 
well-known, generally recognizable dialectic among epistemologists that continues to the 
present day.  The characteristic feature of that dialectic is the putting forth of an analysis of 
knowledge, typically “containing” justified true belief (i.e., analyzing knowledge as justified 
true belief or as justified true belief with some further characteristic), followed by the 
formulation of an apparent counterexample to the analysis.  (Henceforth, I will sometimes 
1
 This thesis has been defended by Crispin Sartwell in “Knowledge is Merely True Belief” and “Why 
Knowledge is Merely True Belief.”
2drop the qualifier “apparent” when doing so contributes to more natural expression.)  Some 
of these counterexamples are counterexamples to the sufficiency of the proposed analysans
for knowledge, some to the necessity.  A natural way to define a Gettier counterexample 
would be as any of the counterexamples arising (in the past or future) from this recognizable 
dialectic.  For my purposes, however, it will be useful to stipulate a narrower definition:  A 
Gettier counterexample is any counterexample, arising from the dialectic just described, to 
the sufficiency for knowledge of an analysans “containing” justified true belief.  This 
definition is historical, leaving open the question of the precise nature of the content of 
Gettier counterexamples.  That question is sufficiently difficult that any answer to it should 
be argued for rather than prejudged in the definition; I will give my answer to the question 
and argue for it shortly.
I said above that I am going to sketch a believable story about why Gettier 
counterexamples merely appear to be counterexamples to TB.  But a believable story is not 
necessarily one that ought to be believed.  My story is, I will argue, one that very well could 
be true given everything else we know about the world, but it is just as likely to be false.  If 
one is already inclined to accept TB, then one will have reason to accept my story.  But 
almost all epistemologists are not so inclined, and so they can either take the story or leave it.  
It appears, then, that this paper will be of interest to only the narrowest of epistemological 
audiences.  To remedy this worry, I would like to begin by briefly describing the motivation 
for holding TB, i.e., by explaining why I think one ought to be inclined to hold it.  The 
ultimate argument for the position of this paper is that TB, together with believable stories 
explaining away both justification and Gettier counterexamples, provides the most 
theoretically satisfying, overall picture of knowledge we have available.  My story explains 
3away Gettier counterexamples and so provides an important component of this picture.  To 
make the argument entirely convincing would exceed the scope of the paper; I only sketch it 
to make epistemologists aware of what I think has the potential to be a formidable position in 
logical space.
Two Reasons to Think Knowledge is Merely True Belief
Practically everyone accepts that true belief is necessary for knowledge.  TB claims that it is 
sufficient as well.  This is not to deny that other conditions may also be necessary.  It is only 
to assert that, if there are further necessary conditions for knowledge, then those conditions 
are also necessary for true belief.  A true analysis of knowledge might contain something in 
addition to true belief, but that additional element will be redundant.  To see why proponents 
of TB assert this, let us focus on the traditional—though now defunct—analysis of 
knowledge, justified true belief (JTB).  TB’s proponent claims that the justification condition 
is redundant at best.
One reason to deny the necessity of specifying a justification condition in the analysis 
of knowledge (which is different from denying the necessity of justification for knowledge) 
is that it allows us to hold a simpler theory of what knowledge is.  TB, quite obviously, is 
simpler than JTB.  It is standard methodology to prefer a simpler theory to a more complex 
one, ceteris paribus.  Thus, we should be naturally inclined to accept TB over JTB and, by 
extension, over all more complex analyses containing JTB.
The force of this reason for holding justification to be redundant at best is real, I 
think, but limited.  After all, there is a parallel reason for holding truth to be redundant at 
best, or belief.  The TB theorist is not motivated by considerations of simplicity alone; he 
4feels that there is something particularly suspect about the inclusion of a justification 
condition in the analysis of knowledge beyond the mere additional complexity it adds to the 
theory.  This feeling is the second reason for preferring TB to JTB.  Let us examine the 
nature and source of the TB theorist’s feeling about justification and then see whether a
similar feeling about other possible conditions for knowledge arises from the same source.
The most prevalent conception of epistemic justification is of a property that a belief 
has in virtue of arising in the right sort of way.  A belief is justified just in case it is produced 
by good reasons or good evidence.  Some might quibble with this formulation, preferring to 
say that a belief is justified just in case it is produced by something like the activity of basing 
beliefs on good reasons or good evidence.  The first way of speaking strikes me as perfectly 
natural, but I will not argue the point.  In the sequel I will simply speak of justified beliefs as 
those produced by good evidence, but the reader may, if she wishes, substitute the longer 
formulation throughout.  Nothing will turn on which formulation we adopt.
Now, when we ask what good evidence is, the best answer we are likely to devise is 
that it is something conducive to true belief.  In some sense, good evidence consistently, 
reliably produces true beliefs.  To put it another way, good evidence naturally has a high 
degree of power to produce true beliefs—this power in high degree is, in fact, the defining 
characteristic of good evidence.  What is striking about the JTB analysis of knowledge is that 
it ascribes to good evidence another, distinct power:  Not only does good evidence produce 
true beliefs, it also combines with (or interacts with) true beliefs (the very ones it has 
produced) to give rise to knowledge.  These observations about good evidence are mirrored 
by observations about bad evidence (or the activity of basing beliefs on bad evidence) and 
non-evidence (or the activity of basing beliefs on things that are not evidence, or on nothing 
5at all).  Bad evidence and non-evidence are not conducive to true belief.  They produce true 
beliefs only inconsistently and unreliably.  They have no natural power to produce true 
beliefs, or at least have this power in a very low degree.  And, though bad evidence and non-
evidence do infrequently produce true beliefs, they have, on JTB, no power whatsoever to 
create knowledge through their interaction with those true beliefs.  It is this double power 
attributed to good evidence, and this double deficiency of power attributed to bad evidence 
and non-evidence, that makes the justification condition of JTB seem fishy.  We ought to be 
able to explain the intuitive lack of knowledge in cases of unjustified true belief, not by 
introducing a new power of good evidence lacking in bad evidence and non-evidence, but by 
appeal to the deficiency of the true-belief-producing power that is definitive of bad evidence 
and non-evidence.  Let me make my meaning clearer by describing a pair of closely related 
thought experiments.
First, imagine that there is a clump of oak trees in my backyard.  They regularly 
produce large numbers of acorns and drop them to the ground.  Suppose that one oak tree in 
the clump is barren:  it looks perfectly normal, but it never produces acorns.  At least, it 
doesn’t until one day when I walk by and notice a single acorn growing from one of its 
branches.  Intrigued, I reach up to pluck the acorn off, but it crumbles to dust in my hand.  In 
this situation, I think, I should be somewhat surprised, but not terribly surprised.  For I 
already knew that the tree’s acorn-producing power was defective, in that it rarely produced 
any acorns at all.  When the tree does manage to produce an acorn, it is somewhat to be 
expected that that acorn will, in fact, be something less than the full kind of acorn produced 
by the other, normal oak trees.  This tree’s acorn is not a true acorn at all, but a mere acorn 
husk sharing no more than its superficial appearance with an actual acorn.  Compare the 
6situation of an unskilled baker trying to make a cake.  He has no recipe, and no experience 
baking—he does not even know that cakes have to be cooked in the oven—but he merely 
tries to replicate the finished product he has seen and eaten in the past.  We might imagine 
him combining various powders and liquids, trying to mold them into a cake shape and cover 
them with icing.  Most of the time, what he produces does not even appear to be a cake—it is 
a strangely colored, amorphous blob or puddle.  Yet, occasionally, the unskilled baker does 
produce something with the superficial appearance of a cake, though, upon cutting it and 
trying to eat it, we always discover it not to be a cake.  The deficiency of the unskilled 
baker’s cake-making power accounts both for the fact that he rarely makes anything that even 
looks like a cake, and for the fact that when he does make something resembling a cake, it 
merely resembles a cake.  When performing at his very best the most that the unskilled baker 
can produce is the superficial appearance of a cake.  Likewise, it is easy to suppose that the 
barren oak tree retains within itself the slightest flicker of the acorn-producing power, but 
even when that power operates at full capacity, the most it can produce is the superficial 
appearance of an acorn.
Now imagine (as a later episode in the first thought experiment) that I am passing by 
my oaks one day and notice that the shade of the barren tree’s bark is slightly lighter than that 
of all the other trees.  Just as the crumbling of the acorn husk surprised me somewhat, so too 
would the lightness of the bark.  But I think the lightness of the bark would surprise me more.  
For I could not see it as a manifestation of that same deficiency—of the acorn-producing 
power—that I already knew the tree to have.  Rather, the bark color would result from the 
deficiency of a distinct, bark-darkening power.  No doubt I would postulate some common 
defect deep within the tree’s genetic structure from which both of these deficiencies stem, but 
7the point is that the discovery of this deep defect is far more surprising than that of another 
manifestation of the acorn-producing deficiency, of which deficiency I was antecedently 
aware.  
Now for the second thought experiment.  Again there is a clump of oaks, all of which 
are fruitful, except for one barren one.  I have this time examined none of them closely, and I 
have never tried to pluck anything from the barren tree.  I have noticed no variation in bark 
color.  Looking out my back window, I see squirrels gather where the acorns fall from the 
fruitful trees.  Where more acorns fall, more squirrels gather, and where there are fewer 
acorns, there are fewer squirrels.  It would be perfectly rational for me to form the hypothesis 
that squirrels gather wherever acorns fall—that the presence of acorns is sufficient for the
presence of squirrels.  Suppose now that, very rarely, I see an acorn fall from the barren tree.  
The squirrels will not touch it.  I now appear to have a counterexample to my squirrel-
gathering hypothesis.  In response, I can form one of two new hypotheses.  First, I might 
hypothesize that the acorns from the barren tree are really not acorns at all—they merely 
superficially appear to be from the distance at which I view them.  In fact, those “acorns” are 
but the defective products of a deficient acorn-producing power I already knew the barren 
tree to possess.  Were I to examine the “acorns,” I might hypothesize, I would find them to 
crumble, to be empty inside, or to be mere husks.  The second hypothesis is that the fruitful 
trees possess, in addition to their acorn-producing power, a distinct power, e.g., a bark-
darkening power.  Here I hypothesize that it is in the nature of squirrels to be attracted, not to 
mere acorns, but to acorns near trees with dark bark.  The barren tree, my hypothesis 
continues, is deficient in two ways:  it lacks both the full acorn-producing power of the 
fruitful trees, and it lacks their bark-darkening power as well.  From the first thought 
8experiment, I think it is clear that, barring further investigation of the matter, the first 
hypothesis is the superior one and the one I ought to believe.
To avert any possible confusion, let us explicitly match up the elements of the second 
though experiment with their epistemological analogues.  The fruitful oak trees are good 
evidence.  The barren one is bad evidence.  The acorns are true beliefs, and the gathering of 
squirrels is knowledge.  The darkening of bark is good evidence’s additional power (on the 
JTB theory) to combine with true belief to create knowledge.  My simple, initial squirrel-
attraction hypothesis (that acorns are sufficient to attract squirrels) is TB.  The acorn from the 
barren tree that fails to attract squirrels is a justification counterexample, and the second of 
the two hypotheses formed in response to it is JTB.  I claim that we have reason in 
epistemology to accept an analogue of the first of the two hypotheses over JTB.  This 
analogue is that the “true beliefs” produced by bad evidence or non-evidence in justification 
counterexamples merely seem to be true beliefs.  (They may actually not be true or not be 
beliefs, but I think it more likely that they are actually not beliefs.)  When operating at its 
very best, the most that bad evidence can produce is something with the superficial 
appearance of a true belief.  Now there is one major difference between our thought 
experiment and the epistemological issue of analyzing knowledge:  Whereas it is very easy to 
see how some physical object could merely appear to be an acorn (it could be empty inside, 
or be disposed to crumble when touched), it is not so obvious how a psychological state 
could merely appear to be a true belief.  We need a story of how we could be led to mistake 
something that is not a true belief for a true belief.  Such a story would explain away 
justification counterexamples, and, I hold, the very fact that it explained them away and 
9allowed us to adopt the analogue of the first hypothesis from the thought experiment would 
give us strong reason to accept it, even if no further argument for its truth were adduced.
This paper does not attempt to explain away justification counterexamples; it attempts 
to explain away Gettier counterexamples.  Yet I believe that all the remarks I have made 
about the former task carry over to the latter.  In a Gettier counterexample, a true belief is 
produced by a means that is not normally conducive to true beliefs.  The true belief arises 
through luck or a freak accident.  The source of the belief is deficient in its true-belief-
producing power.  As in the justification case, I hold that here we would do better to hold that 
the apparent true belief arising from the deficient source is no true belief at all, but merely 
has the superficial appearance of one, than to add another condition to the analysis of 
knowledge, granting to normal, true-belief-conducive situations an additional power to 
combine with true beliefs and create knowledge.  But, again, we need a story of how the 
apparent true beliefs arising in Gettier counterexamples can merely appear to be true beliefs; 
and the very fact that such a story explains how this is possible gives us strong reason to 
accept it.  After analyzing the content of Gettier counterexamples in more detail, I will tell 
such a story.
Gettier Counterexamples
I hypothesize that all Gettier counterexamples share a fundamental, common structure.  I say 
“hypothesize” because I cannot individually consider every Gettier counterexample ever 
proposed and demonstrate the structure’s presence in each, and thus I cannot definitively 
prove its universality.  Instead, I will give six confirming instances—three in this section, 
three later in the paper—that span a fairly wide range among all Gettier counterexamples 
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currently in existence.  The story I plan to tell to explain away these six counterexamples will 
be targeted to the common structure, and so, I propose, we can reasonably expect that the 
story can be eventually expanded to explain away all Gettier counterexamples.
Briefly and abstractly, the common structure I have in mind is this:  A subject 
encounters a certain object and comes to believe truly that it possesses a certain property.  
The object belongs to a larger class of similar objects, objects so similar that, had the subject 
encountered one of them in the same way as the object actually encountered, he or she would 
have come to believe—on the very same grounds—that the similar object possesses the 
property.  Yet the vast majority of the objects in this larger class lack the property; had the 
subject encountered one of the other, similar objects, the resultant belief would almost 
certainly have been false.  Let’s observe this structure in a particular Gettier counterexample, 
the Barn Façades case:
Barn Façades.  S is driving through the countryside, looks up, sees a barn, and 
comes to believe that it is a barn.  Thus, S truly believes that the thing he sees is a 
barn.  However, there are in the vicinity a large number of barn façades, which are 
not barns but look indistinguishable from barns when viewed from the highway.  S 
therefore does not know that the thing he sees is a barn (see Goldman).
The structure I have described is apparent in this case.  In other cases it is harder to 
see.  Take the following Gettier counterexample:
Disjunctive Addition.  S is given good evidence that Jones owns a Ford:  Jones 
shows S a title to a Ford with his (Jones’) name on it, he drives by in a Ford and 
offers S a ride, etc.  Based on this evidence, S comes to believe that Jones owns a 
Ford.  Now, S has a friend named Brown of whose whereabouts S is currently 
completely unaware.  S uses the logical rule of disjunctive addition to infer from his 
belief that Jones owns a Ford the new belief that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown 
is in Barcelona.  The twist is this:  Jones does not own a Ford.  The title was forged, 
the Ford he drove by in was rented, and so forth.  But, by sheer chance, Brown is in 
Barcelona.  Thus, S truly believes that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona, but he does not know it (see Gettier).
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The object encountered here, I claim, is a state of affairs, viz., Brown-being-in-Barcelona.  
S’s encountering of it consists simply in his thinking it up randomly off the top of his head.  
The property S believes this state of affairs to have is being such that either Jones owns a 
Ford or it obtains.  Believing that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is (the 
“is” of identity) believing that the state of affairs Brown-being-in-Barcelona is such that 
either Jones owns a Ford or it obtains.  This state of affairs belongs to the class of all states of 
affairs, the vast majority of which are not such that either Jones owns a Ford or they obtain.  
For instance, the state of affairs Brown-being-in-Madrid lacks this property.2
I asserted above that believing that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona 
is identical to believing that a certain state of affairs has a certain property.  Let me pause 
now to justify this assertion.  Suppose I am quizzing you on your beliefs.  I ask you whether 
you believe that the sky is blue, that dolphins are mammals, that you’re a brain in a vat, etc.  
After each question you introspect briefly and then reply with either a yes or a no.  At some 
point in the sequence, I ask whether you believe that Brutus killed Caesar, and you say yes.  
Now imagine that the next question is “Do you believe that the killing of Caesar was 
perpetrated by Brutus?”  It is likely that this question, falling where it does in the sequence, 
will initiate in you a thought process with quite a different phenomenology from the 
preceding ones.  You will not simply introspect, find the belief, and answer in the 
affirmative.  Rather, you will experience a feeling of recognition—recognition that the 
sentence embedded in this belief query says exactly the same thing as that embedded in the 
2
 Strictly speaking, I am here talking not merely about states of affairs (all of which one might reasonably 
suppose to obtain, just as one may reasonably suppose that everything exists), but about possible states of 
affairs.  Moreover, the large class of states of affairs I refer to must be taken to include only positive ones—it 
does not contain Brown-not-being-in-Barcelona in addition to Brown-being-in-Barcelona.  If the class did 
contain negative as well as positive states of affairs, then, obviously, exactly half would obtain and half would 
not.  Precisely how to distinguish positive from negative states of affairs is a difficult question, but it is not one I 
can enter into here.
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immediately preceding one, only in more convoluted language.  Alongside the recognition 
will be a feeling of repetition, a feeling that the present question simply repeats the preceding 
one, and that to say yes would simply be to repeat your last answer.  Indeed, you might not 
say yes at all, but instead point out to me that I had merely asked you the same thing over 
again in different words.  It is eminently plausible that what explains these feelings of 
recognition and repetition is that it is one and the same state—the same believing—that 
makes the answer to both questions affirmative.  The believing that Brutus killed Caesar is
the believing that the killing of Caesar was perpetrated by Brutus.  If we now imagine 
ourselves quizzing S from the Disjunctive Addition case in this manner, asking him first 
whether he believes that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, then whether he 
believes that the state of affairs Brown-being-in-Barcelona is such that . . ., we can easily
imagine that he would experience feelings of recognition and repetition like those just 
described.  He would probably feel that the second question simply repeated the first in more 
convoluted language.  Thus we may reasonably infer that the two believings underlying the 
two affirmative answers to our two questions are, in fact, one.
Let’s see one more Gettier counterexample with the kind of structure I have been 
describing.
Stopped Clock.  There is a clock on S’s wall that has stopped since the last 
time S looked at it, but S does not know that it has stopped.  S looks at it, and it reads 
5 o’clock, where it stopped.  S thus forms the belief that it is 5 o’clock.  By sheer 
coincidence, it actually is 5 o’clock when S looks at the clock, so S’s belief is true.  
Yet S does not know that it is 5 o’clock (see Russell).
Here S encounters a moment, the present moment.  He encounters it by focusing his attention 
on it while looking at the clock.  The belief he forms about it is that it is 5 o’clock, i.e., that it 
has the property of being 5 o’clock.  Believing that it’s 5 o’clock is believing that the present 
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moment has the property of being 5 o’clock.  The present moment belongs to a larger class of 
moments, all those in the nearby temporal vicinity at which the hands of the clock read 5.  
Since the clock is stopped—has been for a while and will continue to be for a while--the vast 
majority of those moments are not 5 o’clock.  Thus, had S encountered one of those other 
moments in the same way that he encounters the present one, he would have believed falsely 
that it was 5 o’clock.
Representative Concepts
I propose to explain away Gettier counterexamples by telling a story on which the subject 
does not believe the relevant proposition, viz., that the encountered object has the property in 
question.  Instead, the subject believes a different, related proposition which is false:  the 
proposition that all the objects in the larger class to which the encountered object belongs 
have the property.  To tell the story, I will first need to draw two distinctions, and then to 
develop the apparatus of what I call representative concepts.
The first distinction is the familiar one between sentences and propositions.  
Sentences express propositions, and often different sentences express one and the same 
proposition.  “It’s raining today” uttered on Monday and “It rained yesterday” uttered on 
Tuesday express the same proposition, namely, that it rains on Monday.  The second 
distinction is between believings and believeds.  The term “belief” exhibits an –ing/–ed 
ambiguity.  Believings are psychological states of subjects.  Believeds are mind-independent 
entities—propositions.  We must be careful not to confuse these two things.
Now the notion of a representative concept is key to my explanation of Gettier 
counterexamples, so I will devote significant space to its explication.  First, I need to say a 
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few words about what I mean by the more general term “concept.”  I don’t mean anything 
very specific.  I take a concept to be any kind of non-perceptual, non-sensory mental 
representation.  Roughly, my concepts correspond to Hume’s ideas, as opposed to his 
impressions.  In fact, I do not believe that the term “idea” is any less appropriate for what I 
have in mind than “concept.”  We think thoughts about the world, and those thoughts contain 
elements representing things in the world, and these elements are what I call concepts.  
Concepts are constituents of believings.  (I leave it open whether there are corresponding 
constituents of believeds, i.e., propositions.)
I make two important assumptions about concepts.  First, I intend for the notion of 
concept to be wide enough to include particular or individual concepts—concepts that 
represent one thing only and are essentially not multiply applicable.  This strikes me as no 
abuse of the language.  It is perfectly natural to speak of my concept of Julius Caesar or of 
London.  Still, if the only kind of concepts you recognize are general, multiply-applicable 
concepts, then I am using the term “concept” more broadly than you.  When I think about 
Julius Caesar, there is some constituent of my thought that represents or stands for Julius 
Caesar, and that constituent, whatever you may prefer to call it, I call the individual concept 
of Julius Caesar.
The second assumption I make about concepts is that they have or contain modes of 
presentation.  A concept of something represents it as something; at least, concepts 
commonly do this, if not always.  This fact seems pretty obvious to me.  My concept of 
kittens represents them as baby cats.  My concept of Julius Caesar represents him as an 
ancient Roman general.  Another way to put this same point is that concepts in some sense 
contain information.  There are some facts about kittens and Julius Caesar that I would 
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naturally describe as part of my very concept of those things.  It is part of my concept of 
kittens that they are baby cats.  If you told me kittens were not baby cats, I would probably 
insist that you were using the word “kitten” differently from me.  Or, if I were to accept your 
claim with the sense it straightforwardly appears to have, then I would have to do something 
drastic, such as “fundamentally revise my concept of kittens,” or “reject my current kitten 
concept in favor of a new one,” whatever these phrases might mean.  By contrast, it is no part 
of my kitten concept that, on average, kittens take a certain number of days to open their 
eyes.  I could accept or reject this fact without disturbing my kitten concept in any 
fundamental way.  I acknowledge that talk of concepts “containing” information is 
unsettlingly metaphorical, and I allow that whether or not a certain concept contains a certain 
piece of information may be a matter of degree and/or vague.  All I claim is that there is 
some point to this way of speaking—some truth about the nature of concepts that it at least 
roughly captures.
Now I am in a position to introduce the idea of a representative concept.  We must 
first be careful to distinguish representativeness from representationality.  All concepts are 
representational, because they all represent something, but not all concepts are representative.  
As I will use the term, only individual concepts can be representative.  I should also mention 
that I have a second name for representative concepts, “arbitrary” concepts.  Though I 
believe that the term “representative” better captures the nature of these concepts in most 
cases, “arbitrary” will occasionally be more appropriate.  Rather than give a precise 
definition of representative/arbitrary concepts right up front, I will introduce them by way of 
examples, describing each example in relatively loose, inexact terms in order to fix the basic 
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idea in the reader’s mind.  I will make my account more exact after considering these 
examples.
I shall begin with the example that first inspired in me the idea of representative 
concepts, though, admittedly, it is probably the least straightforward of the examples I will 
consider.  I will first describe it in a way that is natural and intuitive, but strictly incorrect, 
and then redescribe it correctly.  The example is a common practice used by mathematicians 
in constructing proofs.  Suppose a mathematician is trying to prove that all members of a 
certain class, C, have a certain property, .  The mathematician will likely begin with a 
statement such as this:  “Let x be an arbitrary member of C.”  Then she will go on to deduce 
certain statements about x, say, “x is 1,” “x is 2,” . . ., and “x is n,” relying only on the fact 
that x is in C. Finally, the mathematician will conclude “x is .”  This routine is taken to 
prove the statement “All members of C are .”  The statements of this proof, starting with “x 
is 1” and ending with “x is ,” are all about a single object, x.  Corresponding to these 
statements are thoughts in the mathematician’s head, and in the heads of anyone who may 
read her proof, about the single object x.  And yet, in some crucial sense, these statements 
and thoughts about x are also statements and thoughts about every member of C; that is why 
they amount to a proof of a conclusion about the entire class.  The statements and thoughts in 
question seem to play two roles, being both singular and general at the same time.  More 
specifically, the concept of x appearing in the thoughts appears to be both an individual 
concept—of x—and a general concept—of the members of C.  The dual nature of the 
concept of x seems to be captured by the word “arbitrary” appearing in the first sentence of 
the mathematician’s proof.  This word indicates that there is nothing special or distinctive 
about x among the members of C; x is a perfectly ordinary, generic member of C, normal in 
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every way.  It is as if the mathematician stuck her hand into C and pulled out one of its 
members completely at random to work with in her proof.  When she goes on to prove 
statements about that member, we see that she could just as easily have picked any other 
member of C at the beginning, and the same statements would have held for that other 
member.  It is because we conceive of x as arbitrary—because arbitrariness is part of our 
concept of x—that when we think that it has the property , we thereby think that all 
members of C have .  Another way to describe the situation at hand is to say that our 
concept of x is a concept of it as representative of all the members of C (or simply of C).  We 
can narrow this last description a bit by saying that we conceive of x as representative of C 
with respect to the property .  There is nothing in our concept of x that has any bearing, so 
far as we can tell, on whether it is more or less likely than any other member of C to have ; 
any information in the concept of x relevant to the having or lacking of  is equally a part of 
our concept of any other member of C as a member of C.  Of course, this relativization of the 
representativeness of the concept of x to the property  is, in the case at hand, needless.  We 
conceive of x as representative of C with respect to any property whatsoever.  Nonetheless, 
in the examples about to come, this kind of relativization will be essential.
I said above that my initial description of the mathematical example would be strictly 
incorrect, and it was.  I pretended there that the class C contained a distinct object named “x” 
and that we had an individual concept of it.  But surely this was pure pretense.  The symbol 
“x” no more names one member of C than any other, and when we “think about x” we no 
more think of one member than any other.  To think about a particular object, it seems to me, 
one must conceive of that object as in some way distinguished from all others.  To think 
about a particular toothpick from a box of 1,000 qualitatively identical ones, I must at least 
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hold it up before my eyes and conceive of it as “the one presently before my eyes.”  If the 
mathematician in our example could literally reach into C and pull out a particular member, 
then we could think of that member—conceived of as the one in her hand—that it was .  
But she can only figuratively reach in, so we cannot think any such thought.  My remarks 
about the mathematician’s proof are still apt, but they must be reformulated in terms, not of 
x, C, and , but of our symbols “x,” “C,” and “.”  Here is the correct description of the 
situation:
The syntax of the mathematician’s language specifies a certain subset of that 
language’s symbols as “designators”—symbols whose business it is to refer to objects.  
Designators are contrasted with symbols like logical connectives and quantifiers, which are 
in a different business.  The symbol “x” is a designator.  When the mathematician writes the 
proof described above, she is demonstrating—or perhaps I should say displaying—that “x” 
has a certain syntactic property Y:  a proof can be written with a single premise comprising 
it—the symbol with Y—followed by the string “is a member of C” and with a conclusion 
comprising it followed by “is .”  (The notion of proof is, of course, purely syntactic.)  
When we read the mathematician’s proof, we are led to believe that “x” has Y.  Moreover, 
we see that there is nothing special or distinctive about “x” among the class of all designators 
with respect to having or lacking Y.  The mathematician could just as easily have chosen “y,” 
“z,” “w,” or any other designator and demonstrated, in precisely the same way, that that other 
designator has Y.  Our concept of “x” is of it as an arbitrary or representative designator with 
respect to Y.  Thus, when we think that “x” has Y, we thereby also think that all designators 
have Y.  Now, we know that when all the premises of a proof are true, its conclusion must 
also be true.  We also know that a sentence comprising a designator designating a member of 
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C followed by the string “is a member of C” is true.  Since every designator designating a 
member of C has Y, it follows that, for every such designator, a proof can be written with all 
true premises whose conclusion comprises that designator followed by “is .”  Hence, every 
sentence comprising a designator designating a member of C followed by “is ” is true.  We 
therefore conclude that every member of C is .
In this description of our mathematical example, the notion of a representative 
concept still plays an essential role.  This time, however, the concept is of a symbol as 
representative of a class of symbols with regard to a syntactic property.  By thinking that that 
symbol has that property, we think that all symbols in the class have the property.  We then 
go on to make further inferences concerning designators of members of C and concerning 
members of C themselves, but these inferences, though mathematically important, are not 
germane to the topic of this paper.  It is important to note that, in the correctly described 
example, “x” is conceived of as representative of all designators with respect to the property 
Y, and now the relativization to a property is essential.  The symbol “x” is not representative 
of the class of all designators tout court, because it is distinguished from all the others by its 
shape.  This distinction is what allows us to have an individual concept of it in the first place.  
If we were to think that “x” has some very specific shape property S, then we would not 
thereby think that all designators have S.  The shape information built into our concept of “x” 
bears on whether or not “x” in particular has S.  Since that information has no bearing on 
whether “x” has the syntactic property Y, however, we can think that all designators have Y 
by thinking that “x” has Y.
Let us turn to a different example.  Suppose you are watching a show about animals 
on television.  At one point the host of the show holds up a strange-looking creature whom he 
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introduces as “Lenny.”  “Lenny,” the host says, “is a lemur.”  As the camera zooms in on 
Lenny, the host describes some of the animal’s characteristics.  He tells you that Lenny has a 
certain kind of diet, has a certain lifespan, lives in a certain climate, and makes certain 
sounds to attract mates.  The host says all these things about Lenny, but it is clear that, in 
some sense, he is also saying them about all lemurs.  Furthermore, you are both thinking 
about Lenny, but in some sense, you are also thinking about all lemurs.  Your concept of 
Lenny seems to be playing two roles, both individual and general at the same time.  As far as 
you can tell, there is nothing special or distinctive about Lenny, among the class of all 
lemurs, with respect to his diet.  Nothing in your Lenny concept has any bearing on whether 
or not he specifically has the kind of diet described by the host.  You conceive of Lenny as 
representative of all lemurs with respect to having that diet, and so to think that he has it is 
also to think that all lemurs have it.  By contrast, if the host said that Lenny had a disease that 
required his keepers to feed him a special diet, you would not, in thinking this thought, be 
thinking that all lemurs have the special diet.  As you think the thoughts expressed by the 
host, you look at Lenny and have him in particular before your mind.  But your concept or 
idea of him seems to be serving not so much as the subject of singular thoughts (in the sense 
of “subject” that is contrasted with “predicate”), but as a psychological aid to help make 
concrete and vivid a number of general thoughts about all lemurs.
Two more quick examples.  First, a physicist is having dinner with his family and, in 
the course of conversation, describes something as composed of atoms.  Curious, his young 
son asks him which things are made of atoms.  The physicist replies, “Everything in the 
world is made up of atoms.  That fork you’re holding right now—that’s just a big collection 
of atoms.”  The son conceives of his fork as representative of all physical objects with 
21
respect to atomic composition.  By believing his fork to be made of atoms, he believes all 
physical objects to be made of atoms.  Second, you are walking down the street with a friend 
who has recently become delusional.  Your friend believes that a worldwide conspiracy is 
working toward his demise.  “Everybody is in on it—everybody!” he swears to you.  At that 
moment he turns and points to a stranger on a distant street corner whom you know neither of 
you has ever seen before.  “That guy is a part of it!  That guy over there is trying to get me!” 
he says.  Both you and your friend conceive of the stranger as representative of the class of 
all people with respect to membership in a worldwide conspiracy.  You think that the 
stranger is part of the conspiracy and thereby think that everyone is.  (More specifically, your 
friend believes it and you simply entertain it.)  In both of these cases, something is conceived 
of representatively after being selected in a particularly random, unprincipled way.  It is clear 
that the son could have asked his question in any context, and his father could have pointed 
to any salient physical object in that context.  Likewise, your delusional friend could have 
pointed to anyone in any situation in which you had had your conversation with him.  The 
randomness with which the objects of discussion in these examples are selected emphasizes 
that there is nothing special or distinguished about them.  Whatever goes for them goes for 
every member of the relevant class to which they belong.
With these examples under our belt, let us try to describe more exactly the nature of 
representative concepts; in the next section I will try to spell out precisely their connection 
with beliefs.  First, it should be clear that it is too simple to think of a concept as 
representative tout court.  Representativeness is a doubly relational property.  A 
representative concept is always a concept of an object as representative of a class C with 
respect to a property .  What it means for your concept of an object to be of it as 
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representative of C with respect to  is for there to be, insofar as you conceive of it, nothing
special or distinctive about that object, among all members of C conceived of as members of 
C, relevant to the having or lacking of .  No part of the information in your concept has any 
bearing on the question of whether the object has , at least, no part of the information 
which is not also part of the information in your concept of any member of C as a member of 
C.  Most individual concepts are probably of their referents as representative of many classes 
with respect to many properties, and as not representative of many more classes with respect 
to many more properties.  Your concept of Lenny, to refer back to an earlier example, is of 
him as representative of the class of lemurs with respect to having a certain diet, but perhaps 
also as representative of the class of mammals with respect to being warm-blooded.  If he has 
an injury, however, you do not conceive of him as representative of all lemurs with respect to 
being injured.
This last observation about representativeness may give rise to an objection that my 
picture builds an unrealistic amount of information into our concepts.  You are supposed to 
conceive of Lenny as representative of lemurs with respect to one property, of mammals with 
respect to another, and of many other classes with respect to many other properties.  But 
surely your concept of Lenny does not contain this glut of information; you are thinking far 
less than all of this when you think of Lenny.  I reply that representativeness is not a matter 
of a concept containing information; on the contrary, it a matter of a concept lacking certain 
information.  Representativeness is a negative or privative property of a concept.  You 
conceive of something as representative of a class with respect to a property when there is 
nothing in your concept with any bearing on whether or not the thing has the property, at 
least, nothing that is not equally contained in your concept of any other member of the class 
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as a member of the class.  Thus, even a relatively simple concept can be of something as 
representative of many classes with respect to many properties.
Representative Concepts and Belief
I now propose to describe, as precisely as possible, the nature of the connection between 
representative concepts and beliefs.  Let me first remind the reader that my task here is 
merely to explain how Gettier counterexamples can appear to be counterexamples to TB 
without being so in fact.  As such, I will not directly argue for many of the assertions I make 
in this section.  The ultimate argument for the view presented in this section, it will be 
recalled, is that it, together with TB and a (still forthcoming) story explaining away 
justification counterexamples, provides the most theoretically satisfactory overall picture of 
knowledge available to us.  I acknowledge up front that some elements of my view will be, to 
some extent, theoretically unsatisfactory.  It makes the nature of beliefs and the semantics of 
belief ascriptions more complicated than we previously thought them to be.  I will try to 
mitigate this problem as much as possible by giving examples to show that the complications 
I introduce are closely analogous to complexities we do have independent reason to believe 
exist.  Thus, even though my view introduces new complexities into the theoretical picture of 
belief, it at least does not introduce any radically new kind of complexity.  I primarily want to 
stress that the reader must not balk when I make certain substantive, non-obvious claims 
without any positive argument.  Some of them will appear to be, on their face, positively 
counterintuitive, and where they do so I will argue that they are not.  Everything I am going 
to say is, I believe, at least intuitively neutral—our intuitions weigh neither for or against 
them.  More than this neutrality, however, I cannot always show.
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In the previous section we saw cases in which a subject S conceived of an object as 
representative of a class C with respect to a property , and which we described loosely as 
cases in which S believed that the object was  but, because of his recognition that the object 
was in no way special or distinct (among the members of C with respect to the having of ), 
also thereby believed that all members of C were .  There are two propositions in play in a 
case such as this:  first, the singular proposition Ps, which we might express with the sentence 
“The object is ”; and second, the general proposition Pg, which we might express with the 
sentence “All members of C are .”  Now I assert the following two claims about the cases 
under consideration:  S believes Pg, and S does not believe Ps.  The second of these two 
claims follows from a stronger one, which I will give a special name:
The Inability Thesis:  If S conceives of an object as representative of a class 
C with respect to a property , then S cannot, so long as he or she conceives of the 
object in this way, believe the singular proposition normally expressed by the 
sentence “The object is ,” i.e., Ps.
The Inability Thesis seems wildly implausible.  Let me give a reason to think that it is not:  
The most straightforward way to deny that someone can hold a particular belief (= believing) 
is to deny that he or she possesses the concepts essential to the belief.  I want to suggest 
another, closely related way to deny someone the ability to hold a belief:  acknowledge that 
he or she possesses the essential concepts and can hold some beliefs involving them, but 
assert that those concepts are too thin or informationally impoverished in a certain way to 
allow him or her to hold the particular belief in question.  Let’s look at an example where we 
might make just this type of denial.
Imagine that a young boy has learned the concept “happy” through exposure to a 
certain class of examples of happiness.  Every case of happiness he has ever seen and heard 
described as a case of happiness has involved someone laughing, giggling, grinning, jumping 
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up and down with giddiness, or something like that.  Now, the boy’s father is a soldier who, a 
few years ago, went missing in action and is presumed dead.  One day, the boy’s mother gets 
a call from the army saying that her husband has been found alive and will be returning home 
soon.  The mother bursts into tears and, when her son asks her why she is crying, she tells 
him that it is because she is extremely happy.  It is almost certain that the boy would be 
deeply puzzled by this claim of his mother’s.  The reason for his puzzlement, it is plausible to 
think, is that his current concept of happiness does not allow him to believe that his mother,
in her current state, is happy.  He cannot even entertain the thought; his mother’s utterance 
does not express a proposition on which he can get any cognitive grasp whatsoever.  The 
boy’s concept of his mother in her current state, on the one hand, and of happiness, on the 
other hand, simply will not “link up” in the right way to form a belief (= believing).  (His 
mother’s happiness in her current state is, for him, a colorless green idea sleeping furiously.)  
The reason for the boy’s cognitive inability is that his concept of happiness is too 
impoverished; it contains too limited a range of information, leaving out an entire dimension 
of the property of happiness.  There are ways of being happy very different from any the boy 
has ever encountered and that form no part of his current concept.  Since his mother is 
currently happy in one of those unfamiliar ways, her son is simply unable to think of her 
current state as a happy one.  Of course, the boy may revise and enrich his happiness concept 
in such a way as to take account of his mother’s state, and then he would be able to believe 
her happy; cases like the one at hand are just the kind that tend to initiate conceptual revision.  
But, as long as the boy’s happiness concept remains unchanged, he cannot think that his 
mother is currently happy.  Now it does not seem right to deny that the boy in this example 
has the concept (or, at least, a concept) of happiness at all, or even to deny that he has the 
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“correct” concept.  In some important sense, the boy’s happiness concept is “the same as” 
your and my happiness concept.  The only difference is that the boy’s concept is thinner than 
ours; it contains less information, but enough important information to make it count as a 
concept of happiness nonetheless.
This example suggests that, when a concept belonging to a person is informationally 
impoverished, or lacking in content in a certain way, then that person may not be able to hold 
certain beliefs (= believings) involving it, even though he or she can hold others.  Now, I said 
above that what it means for a concept to be representative is for it to be lacking a certain sort 
of information, viz., information to the effect that its object is special or distinguished among 
the members of a certain class with respect to the possession of a certain property.  In light of 
this fact, along with our example, the Inability Thesis does not look so wildly implausible as 
it did at first.
There are probably two more sources of intuitive opposition to the Inability Thesis 
lurking in the reader’s mind.  The first is the straightforward thought that we do ascribe to 
people singular beliefs in cases involving representative concepts.  Of the person watching 
the show about Lenny the lemur, we would naturally and, it seems, truly say that he believes 
that Lenny has such-and-such a diet.  I neutralize this objection by resorting to some 
semantic trickery.  The belief ascription, I acknowledge, is true, but what makes it true is not 
that the subject believes the singular proposition normally expressed by the sentence “Lenny 
has such-and-such a diet.”  Without being at all specific, I assert that sometimes a belief 
ascription involving a sentential that-clause can be made true by the subject’s believing a 
proposition that is strictly logically stronger than the proposition normally expressed by the 
embedded sentence.  To be more specific, I assert that sometimes (but perhaps not all the 
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time) a belief ascription of the form “S believes that x is ” can be made true by the fact that 
S believes the conjunctive proposition normally expressed by the sentence “All s are  and 
x is a .”  So what makes true the ascription “S believes that Lenny has such-and-such a 
diet” is the fact that S believes the conjunctive proposition normally expressed by the 
sentence “All lemurs have such-and-such a diet and Lenny is a lemur” (the second conjunct 
being a conceptual truth for S, since the concept of lemur is contained in the concept of 
Lenny).  This proposition implies, but is not implied by, the proposition normally expressed 
as “Lenny has such-and-such a diet.”  
Here is an example to lend some plausibility to my claim about the semantics of 
belief ascriptions:  A dictator comes to power in a foreign land containing a certain ethnic 
group, the Eths, and institutes a policy of discrimination and oppression against them.  In 
particular, he forces all Ethish children to attend substandard schools.  One day, an Ethish 
boy named Joe asks his father why he must attend the worst school in town.  The father 
replies to Joe, “It’s because our leader believes that you are inferior.”  This strikes me as a 
perfectly normal way a real person might talk, and I would not hesitate to describe his belief 
ascription as true.  Yet the proposition normally expressed by its embedded sentence is the 
singular one that Joe is inferior, and we can legitimately suppose that the dictator does not 
believe this proposition because he has never encountered Joe and has no individual concept 
of the boy at all.  In this case, of course, the dictator does not believe the proposition 
normally expressed as “All Eths are inferior and Joe is an Eth.”  He believes only the first 
conjunct—only the major premise of the syllogism, as it were.  But it seems plausible to 
suppose that what makes the father’s belief ascription true is the fact that the dictator believes 
the first conjunct, together with the fact that the dictator could easily find out the second 
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conjunct stating that Joe is an Eth—by, say, looking at Joe or reading certain government 
records on Joe.  This example is not perfectly analogous to the Lenny case, but I think it is 
close enough to lend some credibility to my assertions about the semantics of belief 
ascriptions in the latter case and, by extension, in all other cases involving representative 
concepts.
There is one more source of intuitive aversion to the Inability Thesis.  It is the feeling 
that, in denying that we can believe certain singular propositions in cases where we have 
traditionally thought that we could, it is somehow depriving us of something.  We like our 
beliefs, and we naturally resist anything that threatens to take them away.  When made 
explicit, it is clear that this objection to the Inability Thesis has no force.  If the Thesis is true 
then it has always been true, and to assent to it is no more than to recognize that we lack 
something we never had to begin with.  Nevertheless, perhaps I can assuage the feeling of 
deprivation by suggesting that it stems from a certain picture of the nature of belief (= 
believing) that there is no good reason to accept.  It is the picture of believings as discrete, 
mutually exclusive, non-overlapping objects, like sentences listed one after another on a 
page.  This picture may be correct (whatever correctness could consist in here), but there is 
another one that is just as likely to be correct.
Consider clay statues.  A clay statue is a statue-shaped piece of clay, but it cannot be 
merely that.  For it contains within it innumerable other statue-shaped pieces of clay that we 
would not want to call clay statues, simply for the reason that they are proper parts of another 
piece of clay, viz., it.  To be a clay statue is, to a first approximation, to be a statue-shaped 
piece of clay that is not a proper part of any other piece of clay.  The property of being a clay 
statue is, in part, an extrinsic property.  Now to have a clay statue is to have all the statue-
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shaped pieces of clay it contains, only in such a form that they lack the extrinsic property 
which would make them statues.  You do lack those pieces as statues in one way, but not in 
the way that you would lack them as statues if someone stole the whole statue that they 
compose.  As far as their intrinsic constitution is concerned, you possess them to the same 
degree whether they compose the larger statue or whether they are carved out and made into 
statues of their own.  
Perhaps believings are, at least sometimes, more like clay statues than like sentences.  
Perhaps there are informationally contentful mental state—belief-“shaped” pieces of 
information, so to speak—only some of which count as beliefs because the property of being 
a belief is partially extrinsic.  To be a belief is to be a belief-“shaped” piece of information 
that bears a certain relation to other belief-“shaped” pieces of information:  it is not a “proper 
part” of any other belief-“shaped” piece of information.  (The scare quotes here are, of 
course, all crucial.)  To have a belief is to have all the belief-“shaped” pieces of information 
it contains, only in such a form that they lack the extrinsic property which would make them 
beliefs.  You do lack those pieces of information as beliefs in one way, but not in the same 
way that you would lack them if you completely forgot the whole belief that they “compose.”  
As far as their intrinsic constitution—and, in particular, their informational content—is 
concerned, you possess them to the same degree whether they “compose” the larger belief or 
stand on their own as beliefs.
The Inability Thesis denies one the ability to believe certain singular propositions 
(e.g., the one normally expressed as “Lenny has such-and-such a diet”), but it does so only in 
cases where one can believe a strictly logically stronger proposition (e.g., that all lemurs have 
such-and-such a diet and Lenny is lemur).  In logic we often speak of the premises of a 
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deductively valid argument as containing all the information in the conclusion.  I want to 
suggest that someone who believes the proposition normally expressed as “All lemurs have 
such-and-such a diet and Lenny is a lemur” has a belief (= believing) containing the 
information that Lenny has such-and-such a diet.  Though he has no believing of the 
proposition normally expressed as “Lenny has such-and-such a diet,” he has a belief-
“shaped” piece of information that is intrinsically identical to such a believing and would 
count as such a believing if only it were not “contained” in the believing of the logically 
stronger proposition.  If we recognize that this way of viewing the beliefs in the Lenny
scenario is no less valid than the normal way (i.e., as sentences listed on a mental “page”), 
then the fear that acceptance of the Inability Thesis will deprive us of something valuable 
should, at least largely, subside.
Let us take stock.  I have asserted that in cases like those described in the preceding 
section, in which a subject holds a belief involving a representative concept, the subject does 
not—and cannot—believe the singular proposition we might naturally take him or her to 
believe.  I have argued that this assertion, if not positively intuitive, is at least not 
counterintuitive.  Further, I have asserted that in the type of scenario under discussion the 
subject does believe a certain general proposition, e.g., that all lemurs have such-and-such a 
diet.
Now it will be recalled that when we first introduced this type of scenario, we made 
statements to the effect that a subject S believes that an object x (conceived of as 
representative of a class C with respect to a property ) is  and thereby believes that all 
members of C are .  We have now seen that S’s believing that x is  consists only in S’s 
believing the proposition normally expressed as “All members of C are  and x is a member 
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of C.”  Yet the word “thereby” was central to our description, and it strongly suggests, at the 
very least, that there is some important connection between the individual concept of x and 
the believing of the general proposition that all members of C are —that some thinking of 
x, and of x specifically, somehow supports or underwrites the believing of the general 
proposition.  What can this connection between the individual concept and the believing of 
the general proposition be if the concept forms no part of the believing?
The connection is a purely psychological one:  Entertaining the concept—by which I 
mean brining it to the forefront of one’s mind and using it to attend to or concentrate on its 
referent—serves as a psychological aid to holding the belief.  The human mind is feeble, its 
powers limited.  It is most comfortable thinking of the concrete, the particular, the fully 
determinate—this chair, that tree, that lemur.  Only with great difficulty can the mind grasp 
hold of things abstract, general, and indeterminate.  When it must think generally, it often 
brings to its aid the thought of something particular, a fully determinate, concrete individual 
falling under the abstract concept that figures in the general thought.  The concept of this 
individual serves to support the abstract thought without actually figuring into it.  We might 
say, without too much abuse of the language, that the individual concept is playing an 
important psychological role with respect to the belief, but it is not playing any doxastic role.
An analogy might be drawn between the use of individual concepts I am proposing 
and the use of a mnemonic device.  I believe that the biological taxonomy of organisms is 
kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species.  I am able to believe this, at least in 
part, because I have the concept of the sentence “Kings play chess on fuzzy green couches.”  
Whenever I am called on to state the biological taxonomy, I always begin by bringing (the 
concept of) that sentence to mind.  (Not the concept of the state of affairs represented by the 
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sentence, mind you—just the sentence itself as a linguistic object.)  If I forgot the sentence or 
lost my concept of it, I would, quite likely, be unable ever to recall the biological taxonomy.  
I dare say I would lose the belief that the taxonomy is kingdom, etc. altogether.  My concept 
of the sentence “Kings play chess on fuzzy green couches” supports my belief about the 
biological taxonomy even though that concept clearly does not enter into the belief.  Its role 
is purely psychological, not at all doxastic.  I suggest that representative concepts can support 
general beliefs in a closely, if not perfectly, analogous way.
Gettier Counterexamples, Again
I will now apply the apparatus of representative concepts, developed in the last two sections, 
to six Gettier counterexamples—the three already presented and three others.  My purpose in 
each case is to explain how the counterexample can merely appear to be an instance of true, 
non-knowing belief.
We begin with Barn Façades.  Let us coin the predicate “apparent barn” to apply to 
all and only those things which are either actual barns or barn façades.  Let us also suppose, 
just for ease of discussion, that the apparent barns in the vicinity of the actual barn S sees are 
numbered—from 1 to 100, say; and suppose that S sees #47, which is the only actual barn.  
Now, my explanation is this:  S sees #47 and comes to believe that #47 is an actual barn.  But 
his concept of #47 is of it as representative of all apparent barns (in the vicinity, at least) with 
respect to the property of being an actual barn.  There is nothing in his concept of #47 with 
any bearing on its actual barnhood that is not equally a part of his concept of any other 
apparent barn as an apparent barn.  Thus, the proposition he believes is the one we would 
normally express as “All apparent barns (in the vicinity) are actual barns.”  This proposition 
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is false, so S does not know it.  The proposition we would normally express as “Apparent 
barn #47 is an actual barn” is true, but, by the Inability Thesis, S does not and cannot believe 
it.  The reason the Barn Façades case appears to be a counterexample to TB is that we fail to 
distinguish between sentences and the propositions they express.  In describing the case, we 
truly make both a truth ascription—“It is true that #47 is a barn”—and a belief ascription—
“S believes that #47 is a barn.”  Since the same sentence appears in both ascriptions, we 
assume that one and the same proposition is both true and believed.  But that is false.  The 
semantics of belief ascriptions is messy; they sometimes ascribe belief in propositions other 
than the ones normally expressed by the sentences appearing in them.  This semantic 
deviance occurs in a number of different kinds of case, including those that involve 
representative concepts.
I explain the Disjunctive Addition counterexamples as follows:  S believes that 
Brown-being-in-Barcelona is such that either Jones owns a Ford or it obtains.  But he 
conceives of Brown-being-in-Barcelona as representative of the class of all states of affairs 
with respect to the property of being such that either Jones owns a Ford or it obtains.  Thus, 
the proposition S believes is the one we would normally express by saying “Every state of 
affairs is such that either Jones owns a Ford or it obtains.”  This is false of course.  The state 
of affairs Brown-being-in-Madrid is not such that either Jones owns a Ford or it obtains.  
Another way of describing S’s believing is by saying that he believes that either Jones owns a 
Ford or an arbitrary state of affairs obtains, and this description seems exactly right.  As the 
case is described, S merely pulled the sentence “Brown is in Barcelona” randomly from thin 
air and disjoined it with “Jones owns a Ford.”  Brown-being-in-Barcelona appears to be, in 
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S’s mind, a mere stand in for any state of affairs whatsoever.  It should now be clear how the 
rest of the explanation of the Barn Façades case carries over to the present one.
An objection may be raised to my explanation of the Disjunctive Addition case, an 
objection whose reply is already contained in the explanation.  The objection is that I hold 
S’s belief (in the sense of either believing or believed—the objection could be raised for 
each) to have the logical form of a universally quantified statement, whereas it surely has the 
form of a disjunction.  My reply is that, although S’s belief is not disjunctive, it nonetheless 
contains an important disjunctive part, viz., what follows the “such that” when I say S 
believes that every state of affairs is such that. . . .  The presence and importance of this part 
accounts, I claim, for the intuition that the belief is disjunctive.  In other cases we will also 
find that S’s belief is prima facie of a certain logical form but that this form adheres only to 
one essential component of the actual belief, which is always a universally quantified 
statement.
The explanation of the Stopped Clock case runs as follows:  Believing that it is 5 
o’clock is believing that the present moment m is 5 o’clock, i.e., has the property of being 5 
o’clock.  In the case at hand, let us suppose that S is looking at the clock at m, which is 5 
o’clock, and believing at that moment that it is 5 o’clock.  S has an individual concept of the 
moment m.  How do we conceive of a moment?  What information goes into our idea of it?  
A natural answer is that we conceive of it in terms of what we perceive to be happening (or 
saliently happening) or what state of affairs (or salient state of affairs) we perceive to obtain 
at the moment.  The most salient state of affairs S perceives to obtain at m is that the hands of 
the clock read 5 o’clock.  So, S conceives of m as a moment at which the hands of the clock 
read 5 o’clock.  I claim that S conceives of m as representative of the class of moments at 
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which the hands of the clock read 5 o’clock.  From S’s point of view, there is nothing special 
or distinguished about m, among all moment at which the hands read 5 o’clock, with respect 
to the possession of 5 o’clock-hood.  No information in S’s concept of m bears on the 
question of whether or not m is 5 o’clock that is not equally a part of his concept of any 
moment in which the hands read 5 o’clock, conceived of as a moment in which the hands 
read 5 o’clock.  Thus, S’s believing that m is 5 o’clock is equivalent to his believing that all 
moments at which the hands read 5 o’clock are 5 o’clock.  This latter proposition is false, for 
by stipulation the clock is stopped and so has recently read, and will soon read, 5 o’clock at 
moments which are not 5 o’clock.3
Here is a Gettier counterexample we have yet to consider:
Existential Generalization.  S knows that there are two people in his office, 
Nogot and Havit.  Nogot has given S a lot of good evidence to believe that he, Nogot, 
owns a Ford.  Havit has given S no such evidence.  S forms the belief that Nogot 
owns a Ford.  Then, S uses existential generalization to form the belief that someone 
in his office owns a Ford.  Now, it turns out that Nogot actually has no Ford, while 
Havit does have one.  So S’s belief that someone in his office owns a Ford is true, but 
he does not know that someone in his office owns a Ford (see Lehrer).
To explain the Existential Generalization case, let’s coin a new predicate, “Nogot-set.”  A 
Nogot-set is just any set containing Nogot.  Believing that someone in S’s office owns a Ford 
is believing that the Nogot-set {Nogot, Havit} is such that someone in it owns a Ford.  S 
conceives of {Nogot, Havit} as representative of all Nogot-sets with respect to the property 
of being such that someone in it owns a Ford.  And thus, in believing that {Nogot, Havit} is 
such that someone in it owns a Ford, he believes the proposition we would normally express 
3
 To make the explanation of this case more plausible, we might restrict the class of moments in question to 
moments at which the hands read 5 o’clock in the nearby temporal vicinity, i.e., during the previous few weeks 
or months and during the upcoming few weeks or months.  The reason for this restriction is that S may conceive 
of moments when the hands read 5 o’clock but which are also hundreds of years in the future when the clock 
will certainly no longer work.  The information in those individual concepts may very well fail to bear on the 
question of whether the moments they refer to are 5 o’clock.  Making a restriction like this does not, so far as I 
can tell, vitiate my account.
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by saying that every Nogot-set is such that someone in it owns a Ford.  This is false, since no
one in {Nogot} owns a Ford.  It is clear that, in performing existential generalization, S 
picked the Nogot-set {Nogot, Havit} randomly; he could just as easily have believed that 
someone in the building containing his office, or in the state containing the building, or on 
the planet earth owns a Ford.  S believes that an arbitrary Nogot-set is such that someone in it 
owns a Ford.
The first counterexample from Gettier’s original paper is the following.
Definite Description.  Two people have interviewed for a job, S and Jones.  S 
has counted the coins in Jones’ pocket and knows that there are exactly ten.  S also 
has very good reason to believe that Jones will get the job.  S comes to form the belief 
that the person who will get the job has exactly ten coins in his pocket.  Yet, 
unbeknownst to S, it is he who will get the job, and he also happens to have exactly 
ten coins in his pocket.  S truly believes that the person who will get the job has 
exactly ten coins in his pocket, be he does not know it.
The obvious first question to ask about this case is how we are supposed to interpret the 
definite description appearing in the belief ascription—a thorny issue in the philosophy of 
language.  One traditional interpretation is the Russellian one:  Believing that the person who 
will get the job has exactly ten coins in his pocket is believing that there is someone who will 
get the job and who has exactly ten coins in his pocket.  The sentence contained in this latter 
description of the believing is an existentially quantified statement, and we have already seen 
how to handle those.  First we bring out its domain of discourse, which is presently implicit:  
Believing that there is someone who will get the job and who has exactly ten coins in his 
pocket is believing that there is someone in the set {Jones, S} who will get the job and who 
has exactly ten coins in his pocket.  This is equivalent to believing that the set {Jones, S} is 
such that someone in it will get the job and has exactly ten coins in his pocket.  The set 
{Jones, S} is a Jones-set, and an arbitrary one in this case, so S really believes that every 
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Jones-set is such that someone in it will get the job and has exactly ten coins in his pocket.  
This belief is false, because no one in the Jones-set {Jones} will get the job.
Without delving too deeply into the theory of definite descriptions, let me consider 
one salient alternative to the Russellian view.  Suppose we treat the definite description like a 
demonstrative, whose sole contribution to the sentence is to pick out a referent intended by 
the speaker, that referent being all that figures in the proposition expressed by the sentence 
(in some loose sense of “figuring in”).  In this case we do not have a speaker but a believer, 
and what the believer undoubtedly intends to pick out by the definite description in 
formulating his belief is Jones.  Thus, on this interpretation, believing that the person who 
will get the job has exactly ten coins in his pocket is equivalent to believing that Jones has 
exactly ten coins in his pocket.  If this is what S believes, then it seems clear that we have no 
Gettier counterexample at all.  S knows that Jones has exactly ten coins in his pocket.
A final Gettier counterexample is the following:
Sure-fire Match.  Sure-fire matches are guaranteed to light whenever struck, 
and S has tested dozens of them and always found them to light on the first strike.  S 
is now holding a Sure-fire match that he believes will light when struck.  Now, due to 
an extremely rare chemical impurity in this particular match, it cannot be lit by 
striking.  Yet, S will strike it, and when he does it will light because of a random, 
quantum mechanical fluctuation occurring within the match at that very moment.
Thus S truly believes that the match will light when struck, yet he does not know it 
(see Skyrms).
Believing that the match will light when struck is believing that a certain match-striking will 
be a match-lighting.  Which match-striking?  The actual one from among the class of all
possible ones.4  S believes that the actual match-striking will be a match-lighting.  S’s 
concept of the actual match-striking is of it as representative of the class of all possible 
match-strikings with respect to the property of being such that it will be a match-lighting (or 
4
 Not all possible ones, of course; the match will not light underwater.  The relevant class of possibilities in this 
case is limited to those in the “nearby modal vicinity,” whatever that amounts to.
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would be, if it is a merely possible match-striking).  There is no information in S’s individual 
concept of the actual match-striking with special bearing on the question of whether it will 
(or would) be a match-lighting.  All information bearing on this question is equally contained 
in his concept of every possible match-striking as a possible match-striking.  Thus, by the 
Inability Thesis, S does not believe the singular proposition normally expressed as “The 
actual match-striking will (or would) be a match-lighting.”  Rather, he believes the general 
proposition that all possible match-strikings will (or would) be a match-lighting.  That is 
false, for there is a (nearby) possible match-striking—one not attended by the quantum 
mechanical fluctuation—that would not be a match-lighting.
Conclusion
I think it likely that the story I have told about representative concepts and their relation to 
beliefs can be applied to explain away all Gettier counterexamples in the same manner that I 
have used it to explain away the six presented in this paper.  If so, we have good reason to 
believe the story, for it would figure into a highly theoretically satisfactory account of 
knowledge, one which analyzes knowledge as merely true belief.  Let me conclude by 
emphasizing the limitations of my arguments.  I do not take myself to have proven that 
knowledge is merely true belief (such a proof would require at least a story explaining away 
justification counterexamples, which story would probably be a lengthy project in its own 
right), or even that the story of representative concepts is unobjectionable as piece of 
psychological theory.  My goal has been merely to demonstrate the potential viability of TB 
as a theory of knowledge, and to chart the very beginnings of a course for defending it 
against the standard counterexamples.
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